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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
ST1\TE OF UTAH 
RONALD JENSEN, by his Guardian 
Ad Litem, Sverre Jensen, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
Case No. 8149 
_ MARTINS. TAYLOR, 
Defendant and Appell·ant . 
. ;r ... 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF F'ACT 
At the intersection of 13th East and 5th South in 
/ Salt Lake City, right after midnight on the morning 
--" of October 21, 1952, a collision occurred between a Chev-
/ rolet convertible being driven by Seth M. Oberg, Jr., and 
a Salt Lake City fire truck being driven by defendant, 
Martin S. Taylor. The Oberg car was proceeding west 
on 5th South in the lane north of and next to the center 
and the fire truck was responding to a fire alarm and 
was proceeding south in the lane west of and next to the 
center of 13th South. Plaintiff was riding as a guest in 
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the Oberg car. Ken F·outz was also riding as a guest 
between plaintiff and Oberg, all three sitting on the front 
seat, Oberg to the left side. As a result of the collision 
plaintiff received serious injuries and brought suit 
against the driver of the fire truck. 
The allegations of negligence as sta.ted in the pre-
trial order ( p 9) , are : 
1. That defendant drove at a rate of speed greater 
than was safe, reasonable and prudent in view of the 
surrounding circumstances, to-wit, at a speed in excess 
of 35 miles per hour. 
2. Defendant failed to keep a proper lookout for 
other vehicles in the intersection. 
3. D·efendant failed to keep the fire truck under 
safe, reasonable, and proper control while driving 
through the intersection. 
4. That immediately prior to his entering the inter-
section, defendant did not have his flasher light flashing 
or his siren sounding. 
At the conclusion of plaintiff's evidence the defend-
ant made a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: 
1. The evidence fails to show defendant was negli-
gent in any of the particulars alleged in the complaint or 
referred to in the pre-trial order. 
2. The accident happened solely because of the fail-
ure of the driver of the ca:f in which plaintiff \Vas riding 
to heed the warnings given by the siren and red light, 
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as provided by statute, and negligence of the driver was 
the sole proxirnate cause of the accident. 
3. Plaintiff himself did not exercise reasonable care 
in the approach to the intersection in failing to hear the 
siren or see the red light or to take any precaution for his 
own safety. 
This motion was denied. Since we have assigned as 
error the denial of this 1notion, we desire first to give 
the state of the record at that point in the trial. 
Lorin R. Farnsworth testified that he was driving 
about 50 to 60 feet behind the Oberg car right up to the 
time Oberg entered the intersection. They were going 
55 or 60 miles per hour. As they approached 13th East, 
the red sen1aphore light was on and Oberg applied his 
brakes momentarily, as did also Farnsworth. The light 
changed to green and Oberg proceeded on through at 
approximately 35 miles per hour (pp. 42-44). When 
Farnsworth was at about the point on 5th South indicated 
by an "x" in a circle on Exhibit P-13, a map of the inter-
section, he saw the fire truck coming south at about the 
point marked "x" on 13th South, which is just at the north 
edge of the cross walk across 13th East. F'arnsworth 
'vas then about 50 feet east of the cross walk. At that 
time he heard the siren and saw the red ligh.t. He applied 
his brakes and stopped at the intersection and then pro-
ceeded across the street (p. 44). At the time he heard 
and saw the fire truck, Oberg's car was about 50 feet in 
front of him. At that time Oberg's car vvas close to the 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
4 
east cross walk, even with the car that was stopped on 
that side of the street ( p. ± 7). This car that stopped wa~ 
not out into the intersection at all (p. 49). Farnsworth 
discovered that the tie rod on the right front wheel of 
the fire truck was broken off (p. 64). He went over to the 
Oberg car and turned the radio off, which was on about 
the average way you would usually have it on (p. 46). 
Frank W. Nielson testified that he was stopped for 
the red light heading west on 5th South on the east side 
of 13th East. He had stopped immediately behind the 
cross walk (p. 66). As the light turned green he moved 
up 3 or 4 feet before he saw the fire engine and then 
stopped. Just as the light turned green, he saw the red 
light on the truck and heard the siren, the truck being 
then about one-half block north of the intersection. As the 
fire truck approached the intersection, the Oberg car 
carne by his left and a collision occurred in the center of 
the intersection. Both vehicles proceeded straight ahead 
without the application of brakes. Asked whether the 
truck increased or decreased its speed he answered, BNot 
that I could notice or recall." 
On cross examination he testified that while he was 
stopped waiting for the light to change his front wheels 
were just about at the east edge of the cross walk. His 
windows were up and he heard the siren quite loud and 
saw the red flashing light while he ·was waiting. He 
judged the speed of the truck to be from 20 to 30 miles 
per hour (p. 69). The fire truck was approximately at 
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the cross 'valk north of the intersection as the Oberg car 
passed his car. He also testified that while he was stopped 
at the west edge of the cross walk he could see north 
three-quarters of a block (pp. 71, 72). 
Walter Jensen was driving east on 5th South in a 
Hudson and stopped at the intersection at 13th East for 
the red light. Just before the light turned green he saw 
the fire truck coming south on 13th East three-quarters 
of a block away (p. 52). When it was about one-half 
block away the light turned. red against the fireman and 
green for Jensen. He saw the red light on the fire truck. 
He judged the fire truck "\Vas traveling 30 or 40 miles an 
hour. When asked if the fire truck decreased its speed as 
it approached he testified, "It was not apparent that it de-
creased its speed at all. It seemed like it came on at the 
same rate." (p. 54). It "\Vas at the north cross walk when 
he last saw it. He did not see the actual collision (p. 53). 
·On cross-examination he testified that it was then a good 
three-quarters of a block away when he first heard the 
siren. His windows were closed and the siren kept get-
ting louder as it approached. He also saw the red flasher 
light when he first heard the siren, when the truck was all 
of 500 feet away (p. 56). 
Seth Oberg testified that when he was about 200 feet 
east of 13th East on 5th South the red light was against 
him and slowed down to between 20 and 25 miles per hour 
(p. 77). When about 150 feet east of the east cross walk, 
he noticed the light was about to change to yellow. He 
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let his foot off the brake and coasted down to the inter-
section. The light turned green when he was 50 to 7~ feet 
east of the cross walk. He was then going 20 to 25 1niles 
per hour. He looked to the right but there was a car on 
his right that blocked his vision up north. He looked 
to the left and when he looked right again he was out in 
the center of the intersection and all he had seen was some 
red light coming to the right side of his car (p. 78). He 
was right in the center of the intersection when he first 
saw the red light of the approaching vehicle, which was 
then just past the north cross walk across 13th East. At 
that time Oberg was traveling 25 miles per hour (p. 80). 
The radio was on soft (p. 83). His automobile was a cloth 
top convertible through which you could hear quite a bit 
better than through the ordinary metal top (p. 87). He 
was about 50 feet east of the parked car when he saw the 
light changed to green (p·. 88). He looked to the north 
when he was 15 to 25 feet east of the parked car and con-
tinued looking north until he was alongside the car (p. 
89). The front of the parked car was even with the west 
end of the island, which goes down to the east side of the 
cross walk (p. 90). He savv no cars coming south on 13th 
East as he looked north. The impact occurred about un-
der the street semaphore and his car was hit right behind 
the door ( p. 93). He saw no flasher signal and heard no 
siren (p. 94). At the time he looked north and before he 
was even with the parked car, he could see through the 
trees but saw nothing. He continued looking north until 
even with the car and th.en the car obstructed his vision 
(p. 97). 
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Ronald Jensen, the plaintiff, testified that as they 
approached within 100 yards of 13th East they were going 
35 or more miles per hour. As they approached the in-
tersection the light turned green (p. 107). He looked 
up north when they were about 30 feet east of the east 
side of the cross walk, just back of the Nielson car (p. 
110). He was sitting on the right side of the car, but he 
saw nothing, no red light (p. 109), and heard no siren (p. 
119). That is the last he remembers. While there were 
trees there to the north he could not say if they obstructed 
his view. He did not look that close ( p. 120). 
This constitutes all of plaintiff's evidence as to how 
the accident happened. Plaintiff also called George Peter-
son, a police officer, who made the measurements after 
the accident and placed the results on the map of the 
intersection, exhibit P-13. Peterson fixed the point of im-
pact by a dot with a circle around it on exhibit P-13, which 
is west of the center line of 13th East and north of the 
center of 5th South and is near the traffic semaphore 
(p. 24). The truck was stopped 199 feet south of the 
point of impact, measured to the front bumper (p. 25). 
There were tire 1narks made by the fire truck extending 
in a straight line for a distance of 120 feet north from 
the center of the left front wheel. They may have been 
lighter or darker in spot::; (p. 28). He measured the 
marks on the left side and they went to the left front 
wheel (p. 28) but he did not know on the right side (p. 
33). He saw evidence of front wheel tire marks on the 
left side, but not on the right side. He didn't examine the 
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right marks up to the wheel. He did not examine the tire 
marks closest to the gutter (p. 32). He traced the left 
tire mark back to the beginning but did not observe where 
the left front took hold, nor could he tell how far the right 
front tire mark went (p. 33). 
Plaintiff also called S. S. Taylor, traffic engineer, 
Salt Lake City, who wa.s asked a hypothetical question 
based on various elements assumed to be existing at the 
time of the accident and from such he gave his opinion 
that the truck was traveling at the point where the brake 
marks, testified to by Peterson, began between 30 or 50 
miles per hour (p.180). He admitted on cross examina-
tion that it would make a difference in his opinion if (a) 
the evidence failed to show that the front wheels were 
locked from the time the brakes were put on; (b) if the 
tire marks testified to by Peterson were not actually 
friction marks on the pavement (p. 183) ; (c) if all 4 
marks, those from the front wheels and rear wheels on 
each side, did not run the entire distance (p. 184); (d) 
if the rear tires, which are not visible on the photo (ex-
hibit P-1) and from which h·e obtained his information 
a.s to the condition of the front tires, were not substan-
tially in the same condition as the front tires; (e) if the 
brake marks on both sides \Vere not continuous and un-
interrupted (p. 185). 
He also testified if all the wheels both front and rear 
were locked and sliding, and all the other assumed factors 
were present, the truck was traveling 44 to 50 miles per 
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hour, and if all the wheels, except the right front, 'vere 
locked and sliding at the time the brake mark first ap-
peared, the truck would be going between 38 and 44 miles 
per hour. 
Defendant's evidence "ras as follows: 
There were four firemen riding the fire truck, de-
fendant Martin s .. Taylor driving, Lt. Arthur C. Halla-
day riding beside defendant, Kenneth E. Wells and Rich-
ard H. Taylor riding the rear tail board. All four testi-
fied that the siren was sounded and the red flasher lights 
were on all the way from the fire station at 258 South 13th 
East to the point of impact and that the siren gives a loud 
noise and can be heard for at least 3 blocks and red 
flasher lights can be seen for at least 2 blocks. 
Defendant testified that when about 300 feet north of 
5th South he was traveling about 40 miles per hour and 
the traffic light at the intersection was red (p. 130). He 
then applied his brakes and slowed down to a point about 
125 feet north of the intersection, then going about 25 
miles per hour. During this interim he looked to the east 
and west. He saw the Nielson car waiting on the east side 
and the Jensen car waiting on the west side. He then 
released his brakes and accelerated his speed ( p. 131). He 
could have stopped if he had had to, but when he saw the 
cars holding up for him he released the brakes (p. 135). 
He did not see the Oberg car until Lt. Halladay yelled, 
"Lookout!" He was then right in the middle of the inter-
section, a few feet north of the semaphore. He was then 
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going 30 or maybe 35 miles per h·our (p. 131). His speed 
acceleration had been steady. He did not recall that he 
looked east at any time in the last 100 or 125 feet before 
the impact. He could not recall that he did. Counsel on 
cross examination asked: 
Q. "If you had looked in this period of time 
I am speaking of just about 100 or 125 feet before 
the impact some time during the course of your 
look you would have seen this convertible as it 
either approached the Nielson car or went by it 
because the Nielson car was stopped, of course f' 
A. "Yes." 
Q. "Isn't that correct~" 
A. "I imagine I could have seen it unless it 
was right on the side at the time." (p. 143). 
There was nothing but Nielson's car to block his 
vision (p.143). As he so proceeded he was conscious of 
the two cars being stopped and if they had started up 
he would have noticed them. However, he could not have 
seen the convertible if it had not overtaken the Nielson 
car as he started to look ahead for traffic ( p. 144). 
Laverna Bishop (p. 145) and Mrs. J'. M. Baker 
(p. 156) both lived on the third floor and on the south 
side of the Charleston Apartments, located on the west 
side of 13th East and son1e little distance north of 5th 
South. They both testified they heard the sound of the 
siren coming from the north (p. 147, 158) and that a 
definite interval of time €·lapsed between first hearing 
the siren and the thud of the impact. The siren kept get-
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ting louder as it approached the intersection, becoming 
very loud according to J.\tiiss Bishop (p. 146-148). ~Irs. 
Baker said she first heard the siren when it was \vay 
down the street (p. 163). 
Mrs. Harold H. Holmes, who lives on the east side 
of 13th East, the second house north of the intersection, 
was in bed when she heard the fire engine siren (p. 151). 
It got louder as it approached the intersection. There was 
a definite lapse of time between first hearing the siren 
and the impact. 
Sadie Pack, who lived at 501 South 13th East, the 
south east corner of 13th East and 5th South was in a 
room in a south-west corner of her home. The windows 
were shut but she heard the siren and it was loud (p. 205). 
Carl A. Taylor who lives about 300 feet east of the 
intersection on the south side of 13th East, was in bed 
when he heard the siren. The siren sound came from the 
north and was as loud as usual, loud enough so he could 
hear it in his house. He got up and looked out of the win-
dow and while at the window the crash occurred (p. 206-
208). 
Lt. Arthur C. Halladay \Vas riding the fire truck with 
the defendant driver. When about 250 feet north of the 
intersection he says they were going 40 to 45 miles per 
hour. The driver then slowed down until he got about 
to the corner, when, seeing the traffic had all come to a 
stop he proceeded on through the intersection. Just after 
they had left the north cross walk he saw the Oberg car 
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coming west at a liigh rate of speed, estimating 45 to 50 
miles per hour. Halladay yelled "lookout" but the colli-
sion was inevitable. The crash occurred right under-
neath the semaphore. Because of a broken tie rod Halla-
day had to help steer the truck to a stop (p. 167). He saw 
the Nielson car and the Jensen car stopped as the truck 
came to the intersection. He saw the Oberg car pass the 
Nielson car. The truck had then just passed the north 
cross walk (p. 168). He also saw the ·Oberg car as it was 
just about to pass the Nielson car. The truck was then 
about even with the cross walk. The truck was going 
about 35 miles per hour at the time of the impact (p. 169). 
The speed of the truck was reduced to 30 to 35 miles per 
hour before the driver started to accelerate again. 
I 
Kenneth E. Wells was riding on the left side of the 
tail board standing holding to the handle provided for 
such use (p. 172). He felt the driver hit the brakes and 
slow down. He saw the Njelson car waiting when they 
were about 300 feet from the corner, being on the left side 
of the truck he was not able to see the Jensen car (p.173). 
The defendant had the truck braked down to 25 to 35 
miles an hour when about 125 feet north of the cross 
walk. They were not quite in front of the Charleston. 
Up to that point he saw no car other than Nielson's. The 
truck then gradually accelerated its speed. Wells kept 
looking east and first saw the Oberg car when the truck 
was about at the cross walk. This was just before the 
Oberg car passed the Nielson car. It 'vas going about 
40 or 45 miles per hour. Wells just had time to holler 
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to the other fireman on the tail board "hang on we can't 
miss him." (p.174-175). He saw the Oberg car before it 
passed the Nielson car and it showed no signs of slowing 
down at all. The impact occurred about directly under-
neath the semaphore (p.175). 
Richard H. Taylor, the other fireman riding on the 
rear of the fire engine, testified the driver applied the 
brakes about 300 feet fro1n the intersection and slowed 
down until about 125 feet from the cross walk and then 
continued on again. His speed was reduced from 40 to 45 
to 25 to 30 miles an hour and then gradually increased 
(p. ______ ). When they were about 125 feet north of the 
intersection he first saw the Jensen car waiting. When 
Wells said "we are going to hit" the witness saw both 
the Nielson and the Oberg cars. The fire truck was then 
at the south end of the north cross walk across 13th East. 
There was just a flash and then they hit. 
Ken Foutz, 26 years of age, was riding between plain-
tiff and Oberg in the convertible. The radio was on (p. 
195). When they got almost to the intersection of 13th 
East and 5th South he looked through the trees and saw 
the fire engine (p. 196). The witness made a pencil mark 
on Exhibit P-13 where the trees were. He also marked 
with an ink "x" on Exhibit P-4 where the fire truck was 
when he saw it. Exhibit P-4 is a photo of the intersection 
looking west taken from a point a considerable distance 
east of the intersection and shows the Charleston Apart-
ments. At that time the convertible was about where 
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the picture was taken (p. 197), \Yhich W'ould be a consid-
erable distance east of the intersection, he saw the truck 
and recognized it as a fire truck. He is certain he saw 
the truck and lights but iG uncertain that he heard the 
siren. But his best recollection is that he did hear it. 
He became panicky as soon as he saw the truck. He 
looked over at Oberg and looked back, and scared to death 
but did not cry out or speak (p. 199-200). 
William Y. Tipton, an engineer employed by Salt 
Lake City, gave the following Ineasurements: the parking 
area is 23 feet wide from the west sidewalk line to the 
curb, the sidewalk is 6 feet wide on 13th East. F'rom the 
end of the island on 5th South to the east side of the circle 
on exhibit P-13 is 60 feet. It is 59 feet straight east from 
the circle to the west side of the cross walk. From the "x" 
mark on 13th East at the cross walk to the circle is 55 feet 
(p·. 213). 
Since the map exhibit P-13 is drawn to scale the 
court did not permit Mr. Tipton to make any further 
measurements of distance on that exhibit. 
Exhibit B-14 is a photo of the intersection looking 
west and taken from a point 125 feet east of the pedes-
trian lane. The comparison of this photo with exhibit 
P-4 shows they were taken at approximately the same 
point. Exhibit D-15 is a photo looking north from the 
center of the pedestrian lane on the east side of 13th 
East a.t a point in the center of 5th South. F·rom this 
point it appears that the w·est side of 13th East is visible 
for the entire block to 4th South. 
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STATEMENT OF P·OINTS 
POINT NO. 1. The court erred in denying defend-
ant's motion to dismiss at the close of plaintiff's evidence 
as (a) the evidence failed to establish any actionable 
negligence on the part of defendant; (b) the evidence 
showed that the sole proximate cause of the accident was 
the negligence of Seth M. Oberg, Jr., the driver of the 
car in which plaintiff was r.iding; (c) the evidence showed 
that plaintiff himself was guilty of contributory negli-
gence. 
POINT NO. 2. The court erred in failing to direct a 
verdict in favor of defendant as requested, by defendant 
in his requested instructions. 
POINT NO. 3. The court erred in refusing to grant 
defendant a new trial. 
POINT NO. 4. Instruction No. 14 was erroneous 
as a whole and was prejudicial to defendant's rights. 
POINT NO. 5. That part of Instruction No. 14 
which permitted the jury to predicate negligence of de-
fendant on a failure to keep his fire truck under proper 
control was erroneous and prejudicial to the rights of 
the defendant. 
POINT N·O. 6. That part of Instruction No. 14 
\vhich permitted the jury to predicate negligence of de-
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fendant on a failure to drive 'vith due regard for the 
safety of all persons was erroneous and prejudicial to 
the rights of defenda.nt. 
POINT NO. 7. That part of Instruction No. 14 
which permitted the jury to predicate negligence upon a 
failure to reduce his speed as much as necessary for safe 
operation of the truck was erroneous and prejudicial to 
the rights of defendant. 
POINT NO. 8. The failure of the court to g1ve 
the jury some basis as a guide in determining where the 
truck, as a matter of law, should have slowed down and 
what elements are to be considered in determining negli-
gence based upon the failure to slow down as necessary 
for the safe operation of the truck constituted error .and 
prejudicial to defendant. 
POINT NO. 9. That part of Instruction No. 14 
which permitted the jury to predicate negligence of de-
fendant upon a failure to keep a proper lookout was er-
roneous and prejudicial to the rights of defendant. 
POINT NO. 10. It 'vas error for the court in not 
defining and limiting anywh-ere in its instructions the 
grounds of negligence relied upon by plaintiff for a re-
covery and restricting the right to recover to a finding 
that one or more of such grounds of negligence existed in 
fact. 
POINT NO. 11. It was error for the court to fail 
to instruct the jury that defendant having sounded the 
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siren and his truck exhibitjng red lights, as required by 
lR\v, had in fact co1nplied with the requirement that he 
drive with due regard for the safety of all persons using 
the streets, and that he could continue into and across 
the intersection against the red light unless it should 
appear from the evidence that defendant became aware, 
or, in the exercise of due care, should have become aware, 
of Oberg's failure to yield the right-of-way in time to 
have permitted defendant to avoid the collision. 
POINT N·O. 12. It 'vas error for the court to fail 
to instruct the jury to the effect that if the collision re-
sulted solely from the negligence of Oberg, then defend-
ant would not be liable. 
POINT NO. 13. The court erred in admitting in 
evidence the opinion of S. S. Taylor as to the speed of 
the fire truck in answering hypothetical questions sub-
mitted without proper foundation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT NO. 1. THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS AT THE CLOSE OF 
PLAINTIFF'S EVIDENCE. 
(a) The evidence failed to establish any actionable 
negligence on the part of defendant. 
In the beginning of our Statement of Fiacts we stated 
the four grounds of negligence relied upon by plaintiff in 
his complaint and in the pre-trial order. They are (1) ex-
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cessive speed in excess of 35 miles per hour, ( 2) failure to 
keep a proper look out, (3) failure to keep the fire truck 
under proper control, and ( 4) failure to exhibit the red 
light and sound the siren. 
On the first ground the only persons who testified 
as to the speed of the truck were Nielson and Jensen. 
The former had stopped his car on the east side of 13th 
East and Jensen had stopped his car on the west side of 
13th East. Both were waiting for the truck to pass and 
observed it for a distance of at least one-half block. Niel-
son said it was going 20 to 30 miles per hour. Jensen said 
it was going 30 to 40 miles per hour. S. S. Taylor gave 
his opinion, based upon a number of assumptions which 
were vvholly without support in the evidence, as to the 
speed of the truck as it reached the point where the tire 
marks described by Officer Peterson first began. His 
opinion varied from 31 to 50 miles per hour. We submit 
such evidence does not disclose excessive speed in excess 
of 35 miles per hour. Further there is no evidence that 
35 miles per hour is the speed limit so that any speed in 
excess of that speed would be excessive. Assuming that 
the speed limit was 35 miles per hour, there is no proof 
that the speed was exceeded by a vvitness testifying the 
speed was from 30 to 40 miles p·er hour or 30 to 50 miles 
per hour. 
Finally, when an emergency vehicle, such as was this 
fire truck, is responding to a fire alarn1, the statute, Sec. 
41-6-76 U.C.A., enacted by Chapter 65, 1949 Session Laws, 
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expressly authorizes a speed in excess of the prirna facie 
speed limits. A discussion of the statutes relating to 
authorized emergency vehicles will be given later in this 
brief. It is also significant to here point out that when 
the case was submitted to the jury, nowhere in its instruc-
tions did the trial court submit speed in excess of 35 miles 
per hour as an element of negligence relied on by plaintiff 
or to be considered by the jury. We think the foregoing 
is sufficient to show that the plaintiff did not make out 
a case on the element of excessive speed. 
As to failure to keep a proper look out there is like-
wise no supporting evidenc-e. Both Farnsworth and Niel-
son. place the fire truck at the north cross walk across 
13th East, as the Oberg car passed the Nielson car, which 
was standing east of the east cross walk across 5th S.outh. 
As shown by the map, Exhibit P-13, the truck was then 
55 feet from the point of i1npact and Oberg's car was 59 
feet from the same point. Since Oberg's car was struck 
behind the door its front end had actually traveled at 
least 6 or 8 feet beyond the point of impact, so the car 
really traveled about 65 or 67 feet while the truck was 
traveling 55 feet. The evidence shows that the east and 
west traffic had heard the siren and seen the fire truck 
and was stopped to yield the right of way. The accident 
happened because the Oberg car suddenly emerged from 
behind the Nielson car into the intersection. There is not 
the slightest evidence that the Oberg car was visible at 
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a time and place before the accident so as to convict the 
defendant of negligence in not discovering it in time to 
avoid a collision. 
There is likewise no evidence whatever to sustain the 
allegation that defendant did not have the truck under 
proper control. The evidence is all to the contrary. He 
brought the truck to a stop in a straight line according 
to Officer Peterson's observations notwithstanding the 
tie rod on the right front wheel was broken. The mere 
fact that a collision occurred does not establish lack of 
control. 
Three of plaintiff's witnesses, Farnsworth, Jensen 
and Nielson, all testified that the truck had red flasher 
lights going and the siren sounding. Jensen saw and 
heard this while the truck was three-quarters of a block 
north of the intersection, at least 500 feet away. Nielson 
saw and heard the truck while it was one-half block away. 
It was the siren and the Ted light that attracted their 
attention to the truck and caused them to wait for the 
truck to pass. Certainly the plaintiff's and Oberg's mere 
negative statement that they did not hear the siren or 
see the red light raises no issue for the jury in view of 
the positive testimony of plaintiff's own witnesses above 
referred to. Oberg admitted he saw the red light immedi-
ately before the impact so his testimony raises no issue 
as to the red light being on. Either they failed to look 
or hear, or they heard with unhearing ears and looked 
with unseeing eyes, or th·e radio was on and prevented 
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them fron1 hearing. The plaintiff said he glanced north 
when they were back of Nielson's car but the glance was 
so casual he couldn't tell whether the trees in the park-
ing created an obstruction to his view. Oberg says his 
view was obstructed by the Nielson car. 
We sub1nit the plaintiff failed to establish negligence 
on the part of defendant or any of the grounds relied 
upon. 
(b) The evidence above referred to establishes 
that the sole proximate cause of the accident, regardless 
of any negligence on the part of defendant in the par-
ticulars alleged, was the negligence of Oberg in heedless-
ly and recklessly driving into the intersection at a time 
when the fire truck was plainly visible and had the right 
of way and was in such a position that a collision was in-
evitable. Had Oberg so much as glanced to the north as 
he passed Nielson's car, or if he had merely observed the 
intersection, assuming he could not have seen anything 
before, he could have seen the fire truck entering the in-
tersection for it was at that point at that time according 
to F-arnsworth and Nielson, and there is no dispute on 
that point. Oberg says he was going 20 miles per hour. 
He had to travel over 60 feet to get to the point of im-
pact. Certainly he could ha-\ e stopped or slowed down so 
as to permit the truck to pasf•. We think the situation here 
is similar to that in Ha.a1stritch v. O.S.L.R.R. Co., 70 
Utah 552, 262 P. 100, where t twas held that the sole proxi-
nlate cause of the collision between the car in which plain-
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tiff was riding as a guest and the railroad car being 
pushed across the street, regardless of negligence on the 
part of the railroad, was the driver's negligence in fail-
ing to see and heed that which was plainly visible. 
(c) Plaintiff admitted tha.t he looked north and saw 
and heard nothing. At that time, according to Nielson 
and Farnsworth, the fire truck was at the north cross 
walk across 13th East. The fire siren was sounding and 
the red lights were flashing. A person cannot be heard 
to say that he didn't see that which was plainly visible 
before him or did not hear that which was clearly audible 
in his position. "The duty to look has inherent in it the 
duty to see what is there to be seen and pay heed to it." 
Mungus v. Olsson, ______ Ut. ______ , 201 P. 2d 495. As stated in 
Brown v. Lilli, 281 Mich. 170, 274 N.W. 751, where plain-
tiff testified she looked and saw nothing. "If she looked 
and failed to see that which was plainly visible·, she will 
be held in point of law to have seen it." 
Being held in law as having seen the fire truck since 
it was there plainly visible before him, plaintiff had a 
duty to warn Oberg or do something to avoid the collision. 
He did nothing. We submit his negligence should prevent 
him from a recovery in this action. 
POINT NO. 2. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
DIRE,CT A VERDICT IN FAVOR OF DEFENDANT AS RE-
QUESTED BY DEFENDANT IN HIS REQUESTED INSTRUC-
TIONS. 
Defendant, in his first requested instruction asked 
the court to direct a verdict in his favor of no cause of 
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action, (p. 225) and took exception to the court's refusal 
to give it (p. 219). All that has been said under Point 
No.1 is applicable here. In addition we have the evidence 
submitted by defendant and his witnesses. The speed of 
the truck as it approached the intersection is definitely 
fixed as being not in excess of 35 miles per hour by all 
four firemen. The evidence is likewise definite that the 
speed of the truck was reduced from 40 to 45 miles per 
hour down to 25 to 35 miles per hour, when about 125 
feet north of the cross walk. While it is true Jensen and 
Nielson testified they did not notice a reduction or ac-
celeration in speed, this would constitute no conflict with 
the definite evidence of the four firemen. 
On the question of keeping a proper look out, de-
fendant's testimony shows he saw the Nielson and Jensen 
cars stopped and waiting, and then proceeded on through 
the intersection watching the traffic ahead, since he had 
the right of way. The fact that he did not see the Oberg 
car as he came close to and into the intersection does not 
convict him of failing to keep a proper look out. When 
he was proceeding with the siren sounding and the red 
lights flashing and on an emergency call, he had a right 
to assume that all persons using the street would yield 
the right of way, until it should reasonably appear that 
the right of way was not being yielded. When the Oberg 
car first became visible to Halladay and Wells, who were 
looking easterly, it was then so close and coming at such 
speed that a collision \Vas inevitable. There is no other 
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evidence as to when the Oberg car became visible, and no 
evidence that it was discoverable sooner by keeping a rea-
sonable look out. 
The defendant's evidence makes it clear and without 
dispute that he had the truck under proper control as he 
ap·pToached and entered the intersection and even after 
the impact. He had slowed down so he could have stopped 
at the interse.ction when it appeared to him that the 
traffic, east and west, was stopped and yielding him 
the right of way. He then accelerated his speed and en-
tered the intersection. The impact broke the right tie rod 
but even this did not throw the truck out of control. He 
brought it to a stop in a straight line. There is no evi-
dence to the contrary. The other three firemen confirmed 
the point. There is a total absence of any evidence show-
ing a lack of p,rop,er control. 
As to Plaintiff's allegation that the defendant did 
not sound a siren and did not exhibit a red light, the 
court on its own motion instructed the jury it must con-
sider that the law had been complied with in that regard. 
So that element is eliminated from the case. 
Since there was a failure of proof as to each of the 
grounds of negligence relied on for recovery, we submit 
the court should have directed the jury to bring in a ver-
dict of no cause of action. 
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POINT NO. 3. THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT DEFENDANT A NEW TRIAL. 
Defendant seasonably filed a motion for a new trial 
or for judgment non obstante veredicto (p. 253). In this 
1notion defendant specifically and separately assigned as 
error and presented to the trial court for consideration 
each and all the points heretofore stated and relied on 
for reversal in this appeal. Since all these points will be 
argued hereafter, we refer the court th~reto to avoid 
repetition. We earnestly contend the court should have 
granted a new trial or have entered judgment for defend-
ant notwithstanding the verdict. 
POINTS NOS. 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, AND 10, ALL RELATING 
TO ERROR IN INSTRUCTION NO. 14. 
Instruction No. 14 as given by the court reads as 
follows: 
"The traffic laws of Utah give to the driver 
of a fire truck, ansvvering an alarm, certain privi-
leges not enjoyed by drivers of ordinary vehicles. 
These privileges include the right to proceed past 
a red light without stopping, but the law speci-
fically provides that the fireman can do so, only 
after slowing down as much as may be necessary 
for safe operation of the fire truck. It is also pro-
vided by law that, in using such a privilege, the 
fireman shall not be relieved of the duty to drive 
with due regard for the safety of all persons. 
"It is admitted in this case that the defendant 
proceeded past the red light on 13th East Street. 
You must determine if he used this privilege prop-
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erly, by reducing his speed as n1uch as may have 
been necessary for safe operation of the fire truck, 
and by driving with due regard for the safety of 
all persons. 
"If you find, by a preponderance of the evi-
dence, that the defendant negligently failed to re-
duce liis speed as much as was necessary for safe 
operation of the truck, or negligently failed to 
keep the truck under proper control, or negligently 
failed to keep a proper lookout for other vehicles 
in or approaching the intersection, and that such 
failures, or any of them, proximately caused the 
accident and injuries to the plaintiff, your verdict 
must be for the plaintiff and against the defend-
ant." 
The defendant excepted to the instruction as a whole 
and to the various specific parts as are covered by points 
5, 6, 7' & 9 ( p. 219). 
In Instruction No. 13 the jury were told that reason-
able minds could not differ on the proposition that the 
fire truck was responding to an emergency call; that it 
was equipped with red lights visible for a distance of 500 
feet in front of the truck; and· that the siren was being 
sounded prior to and at the time of collision; and so the 
jury must find these elements as being established. 
Originally, it was held by this court in Roll.ow v. Og-
den City, 66 Utah 475, 243 P. 791, that the statutes and 
ordinances regulating speed of vehicles on the public 
streets and highways had no application to a fire depart-
ment vehicle. 
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In Chapter 52 Page 116, Section 5, Laws of 1941, the 
legislature made all vehicles of the state and its subdivi-
sions subject to the provisions of the act regulating traf-
fic, subject to exceptions as are set out in the act with 
reference to emergency vehicles. Under this section an 
emergency vehicle was required to slow down upon ap-
proaching a red or stop signal "as necessary for safety 
but may proceed cautiously past such red or stop sign 
or signal." 
Section 41 provides as follows: 
"The prima facie speed limitations set forth 
in this act shall not apply to authorized emergency 
vehicles when responding to emergency calls and 
the drivers thereof sound audible signal by bell, 
siren, or exhaust whistle. This provision shall 
not relieve the driver of any authorized emergency 
vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard 
for the safety of all persons using th·e, street, nor 
shall it protect the driver of any such vehicle from 
the consequence of a reckless disregard of the 
safety of others." 
Section 63 provided : 
"(a) Upon the immediate approach of an 
authorized emergency vehicle, when the driver is 
giving audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, 
or bell, the driver of every other vehicle shall yield 
the right-of-way and shall immediately drive to a 
position parallel to, and as close as possible to, 
the right-hand edge or curb of the highway clear 
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of any intersection and shall stop and remain in 
such position until the authorized emergency ve-
hicle has passed, except when otherwise directed 
by a police officer. 
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve 
the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle 
from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all p,ersons using the highway." 
These sections were carried into U.C.A. 1943 as sec-
tions 57-7-82, 57-7-118 and 57-7-140, respectively. In 1949, 
Chapter 65, the legislature amended sections 57-7-82 and 
57-7-140 and repealed section 57-7-118. Section 57-7-82, 
as amended, incorporated the subject matter of exceeding 
the prima facie speed limits theretofore contained in sec-
tion 57-7-118, U.C.A. 1943. S.ection 57-7-140, U.C.A. 1943, 
was amended to provide for displaying a red light visible 
500 feet in front of the vehicle as an additional require-
lnent to that of sounding the siren. Sections 57-7-82 and 
57-7-140, as so amended in 1949, were carried in U.C.A. 
1953 as sections 41-6-14 and 41-6-76. We quote these sec-
tions: 
"57 -7-82. (a) The provisions of this act ap-
plicable to the drivers of vehicles upon the high-
ways shall apply to the drivers of all vehicles 
owned or operated by the United States, this state 
or any county, city, town, district, or any other 
political subdivision of the state, except as pro-
vided in this section and subject to such specific 
exceptions as are set forth in this act with refer-
ence to authorized emergency vehicles. 
(b) The driver of an authorized emergency 
vehicle, when responding to an emerg~ncy call 
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or when in the pursuit of an actual or suspected 
violator of the law or when responding to but not 
upon returning from a fire alarm, may exercise 
the privileges set forth in this section, but subject 
to the conditions herein stated. 
(c) The driver of an authorized emergency 
vehicle may: 
1. Park or stand, irrespective of the provi-
sions of this act; 
2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign, but only after slowing down as may be neces-
sary for safe operation; 
3. Exceed the prima facie speed limits so 
long as he does not endanger life or property; 
4. Disregard regulations governing direction 
of movement or turning in specific directions. 
(d) The exemptions herein granted to an 
authorized emergency vehicle shall apply only 
when the driver of any said vehicle while in motion 
sounds audible signal by bell, siren or exhaust 
whistle as may be reasonably necessary, and when 
the vehicle is equipped with at least one lighted 
lamp displaying a red light visible under normal 
atmospheric conditions from a distance of 500 feet 
to the front of such vehicle, except tha.t an au-
thorized ernergency vehicle operated as a police 
vehicle need not be equipped with or display a red 
light visible from in front of the vehicle. 
(e) The foregoing provisions shall not re-
lieve the driver of an authorir.ed emergency ve-
hicle from the duty to drive with due regard for 
the safety of all persons, nor shall such provisions 
protect the driver from the consequences of his 
reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
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(f) The p,rovisions of this act shall not apply 
to persons, teams, motor vehicles and other equip-
ment while actually engaged in work upon the sur-
face of a highway, but shall apply to such persons 
and vehicles when traveling to or from such work." 
"57-7-140. (a) Upon the immediate approach 
of an authorized emergency vehicle equipped with 
at least one lighted lamp exhibiting red light vis-
ible under normal atmospheric conditions froru a 
distance of 500 feet to the front of such vehicle and 
when the driver is giving audible signal by siren, 
exhaust whistle or bell, the driver of every other 
vehicle shall yield the right-of-way and shall im-
mediately drive to a position parallel to, and as 
close as possible to, the right-hand edge or curb of 
the highway, clear of any intersection and shall 
stop and remain in such position until the author-
ized emergency vehicle has passed, except when 
otherwise directed by a police officer. 
(b) This section shall not operate to relieve 
the driver of any authorized emergency vehicle 
from the duty to drive with due regard for the 
safety of all person~ using the highway." 
It will be noticed that in the 1949 laws that part of 
Section 5 of 1941 laws, permitting an emergency vehicle 
to proceed cautiously past a red light or stop sign was 
eliminated. On the matter of exceeding the prima facie 
speed liinit the 1949 law, section 57-7-82 (c) (3) added 
the words "so long as he does not endanger life or prop-
erty." 
Since we challenge Instruction No. 14 as a whole1 
and also its several p,arts, an interpretation of the stat-
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utes above quoted is i1nperative. We think the following 
authorities lay down the proper criteria by which the 
rights and duties of defendant in this case should be 
determined. The leading case, one which is frequently 
cited, is Balthaser v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 167 Cal. 302, 
202 P. 37, 18 A.L.R. 452. 
In this case a fire truck responded to a call and cut 
the corner at an intersecting street and ran into defend-
ant's train, killing one fireman and injuring another. 
The City of Pasadena paid compensation and brought 
suit to recover over again against the Railway Co. The 
statutes required that all vehicles in 1naking a turn on 
intersecting streets to make the turn by the center of the 
intersection and also provided that no person should op-
erate a motor vehicle in excess of 15 miles per hour in 
approaching or going around corners or in approaching 
or traversing intersecting highways. The statute also 
provided: 
"Police patrol v;agons, police ambulances, fire 
patrols, fire engines and fire apparatus in all 
cases while being opera ted as such, shall have 
the right of way with due regard to the safety of 
the public; but this provision shall not protect 
the driver or operator of any such vehicle or his 
employer or principal from the consequence of 
the arbitrary exercise of this right or for injuries 
wilfully inflicted." 
It was held that while the language of the statute was 
broad enough to apply to fire trucks in fixing speed 
limits, it must be construed as excluding such vehicles. 
The court says : 
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"It follows that the general rules of the road 
relating to speed and to the turning of corners con-
tained in the Motor Vehicle Act do not apply to 
fire or police apparatus. We have only to con-
sider the utter absurdity of requiring peace offi-
cers to observe the arbitrary speed limits fixed by 
the Motor Vehicle Act when pursuing criminals, 
who may be fleeing in high-power cars at twice 
the legal limit, to make manifest that the legis-
lature did not have in view such a limitation on 
peace officers. And it is equally clear that they 
did not contemplate retarding the speed of fire 
apparatus in going to a fire." 
In construing the language "due regard to the safety 
of the public," the court says: 
"It is evident that the right of way of fire 
appa~atus over other vehicles is dependent upon 
'due regard to the safety of the public' only in 
so far as such 'due regard' affects the person re-
quired to yield the rjght of way. Notice to the per-
son required to yield the right of way is essential, 
and a reasonable opportunity to stop or otherwise 
yield the right of way necessary in order to charge 
a person with the obligation fixed by law to give 
precedence to the fire apparatus." 
Lucas v. City of Los Angeles, 10 Cal. 2d 876, 75 I). 
2d 599. Plaintiff was a guest passenger in an automobile 
being driven across the street intersection on the right 
side of the street, at a lawful rate of speed, in response 
to a mechanical "Go" signal. A police automobile oper-
ated upon authorized emergency business, traveling at a 
high rate of speed and disregarding the traffic "Stop" 
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signal, crashed into the automobile. The statute made 
the City liable for the negligent operation of its vehicles, 
even though in a governmental capacity. The court cites 
and relies upon the Balthaser Case. Since the decision 
of that case, the statute has been amended to provide that 
the provisions regulating the speed of vehicles shall not 
apply to authorized emergency vehicles, with the proviso 
that the section should not relieve the driver "from the 
duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all per-
sons using the highway, nor shall it protect the driver 
of any such vehicle from the consequence of an arbitrary 
exercise of the privileges declared in this section." 
The court savs: 
•i 
""The expression ''vith due regard for the 
safety' of all persons using the highway was ex-
plained in the Balthasar Case, where the court 
said, 187 Cal. 302, at page 311, 202 p. 37, 41, 19 
.A .. L.R. 452; 'It is evident that the right of way of 
fire apparatus over other vehicles is dependent up-
on 'due regard to the safety of the public only in 
so far as such 'due regard' affects the person re-
quired to yield the right of way. Notice to the per-
son required to yield the right of way is essential, 
and a reasonable opportunity to stop or otherwise 
yield the right of 'vay necessary in order to charge 
a person with the obligation fixed by law to give 
precedence to the fire apparatus.' This is the only 
reasonable interpretation that the statute will 
bear. If the driver of a.n emergency vehicle is a,t 
all times required to drirue with dne regar·d for the 
safety of the p;ublic as all other drivers are re-
quired to do, then all the provisions of these stat-
ntes rela,ting to ernergency vehicles become mean-
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ingless and. no privileges a,re gra,nted to then1. Bnt 
if his 'due regard' for the safety of others means 
that he should, by su.itable warning, give othe:rs 
a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of way, 
the statutes become workable for the purpos.e:s in-
tended. (Italics added.) 
"The expression 'arbitrary exercise of the pri-
vileges' has also caused some confusion. Since the 
vehicles are excluded from the restrictions of 
speed and right of way, negligence cannot be pre-
dicated on those elements if proper warning has 
been given. These are among the 'privileges' 
which are granted by the statutes. An arbitrary 
exercise of them may rest upon the question 
whether an emergency in fact existed. The statute 
has determined this question in part by the limita-
tion in section 120 to cases where the emergency 
vehicle is engaged in the chase of violators of the 
law or in response to a fire alarm. Members of 
the fire and police departments are relieved from 
civil liability when 'responding to an alar1n of fire 
or an emergency police call.' Thus, if such ave-
hicle is being operated in response to a fire alarm, 
excessive speed alone is not an arbitrary exercise 
of them. 
"Some confusion has also arisen over the 
use of the expression in section 132 and similar 
statutes requiring the operators of these vehicles 
'to sound audible signal by siren.' Section 554 of 
the Vehicle Code, St. 1935, p. 187, has clarified this 
somewhat by using the language: 'Upon the im-
mediate approach of an authorized emergency 
vehicle giving audible signal by siren.' It will be 
noted· that it is the sounding or the giving of aud-
ible signal that fixes the right of way and relieves 
the driver of negligence. Where there is dispute 
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as to whether the party injured heard the signal, 
it is a question of fact to be determined by the jury, 
but only in so far as that is material to the issue 
of his contributory negligence. The statutes are 
clear that when an audible signal is given the op-
era tor of the emergency vehicle has a clear right 
of way. The giving of the signal is the measure 
of care on his part, and if this is done his duty 
of care is performed, subject to the limitation as 
to 'arbitrary' conduct as hereinbefore noted. 
4
'0ur conclusions from the foregoing are that 
when the operator of an emergency vehicle re-
sponding to an emergency call gives the statutory 
notice of his approach the employer is not liable 
for injuries to another, unless the operator has 
made an arbitrary exercise of these privileges. 
In such cases speed, right of way, and all other 
'rules of the road' are out of the picture; the only 
questions of fact, in so far as the public owner is 
concerned, are first, whether there was an emer-
gency call within the terms of the statute; and 
third, whether there was an arbitrary exercise of 
these privileges. Here the en1ergency was con-
ceded, the sounding of the siren was proved by the 
only substantial evidence offered, and an arbi-
trary exercise of the privileges has not been 
shown." 
Ra;ynor v. City of Arcata, 11 Cal. 2d 113, 77 P. 2d 
1054. l~laintiff was injured when his automobile was 
struck by an automobile of the defendant City which was 
operated by the Fire Chief in response to an alarm. Plain-
tiff was driving on a through street with the traffic heavy 
on both sides of the highway. He entered the intersection 
in second gear at about 20 Iniles per hour. He charged 
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the Fire Chief drove at an excessive speed; that he failed 
to stop or slacken his speed at the stop sign; that he did 
not have a proper or efficient siren or did not sound a 
siren or signal with sufficient distinctness to be heard. 
Plaintiff himself and the driver of the car immediately 
following, testified they heard no siren. The court 
says the vital issue in this case was whether the Fire 
Chief sounded his 'varning siren as he proceeded at a 
high rate of speed in response to a fire alarm. The court 
refers to the Lucas case and says: 
"A warning siren having been sounded, negli-
gence of the driver could not be predicated on his 
rate of speed or failure to obey the 'stop' sign. An 
authorized emergency vehicle responding to an 
emergency call is exempt from limitations of speed 
and other rules of the road, such as those relating 
to the right of 'yay. The exemption from speed 
limits and right of way is statutory. Sections 
120 and 132, Motor Vehicle Act, St. 1923, pp. 556, 
560, as amended by St. 1929, pp. 539, 542; now sec-
tions 517 and 554, Vehicle Code, St. 1935, pp. 178, 
187. The exemption from other rules of the road 
has been established by judicial decisions, notably 
by Balthasar v. Pacific Electric Ry., 187 Cal. 302, 
202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R. 452. 
"The provisions in sections 120 and 132, supra, 
to the effect that the exemptions there given shall 
not relieve the driver of an emergency vehicle of 
the duty to drive with due regard to the safety of 
the public, means that the driver must, 'by suitable 
warning, give others a reasonable opportunity to 
yield the right of way.' Lucas v. City of Los 
Angeles, Cal. Sup., 75 P. 2d 599, 603. The sections 
also provide that the exemption shall not protect 
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the driver from 'an arbitrary exercise' of the pri-
vileges there granted. But an arbitrary exercise 
of said privileges cannot be predicated upon the 
elements of speed and failure to observe other 
rules o£ the road where a warning has been given. 
'In such cases speed, right of way, and all other 
'rules of the road' are out of the picture.' 75 P. 
2d 599, 605. 
"In the instant case the evidence as to whether 
a warning signal was given was in conflict. The 
vice of the instructions given to the jury is that 
they authorize the jury to predicate a finding of 
negligence on the fire chief's speed and failure to 
observe the boulevard stop even though the jury 
conclude upon the conflicting evidence that a 
sufficient warning signal had in fact been given. 
The effect of the instructions was to authorize 
the jury to determine as a 1na tter of fact whether 
in traveling at the rate of speed shown and in fail-
ing to observe the boulevard stop the Fire Chief 
had driven 'with due regard for the safety of all 
persons using the highway' or had been guilty of 
an 'arbitrary exercise' 'of the privileges accorded 
e1nergency vehicles." 
R·eed L:. Sintpson, 32 Cal. 2d ±±4, 196 P. 2d 895. This 
is an action brought by the surviving widow and children 
of J'ohn Reed, a highway patrol officer, for death which 
occurred when the motorcycle he was riding collided with 
defendant's auto1nobile. The trial resulted in a verdict 
for defendant and the appeal is on the instructions of 
the court. The officer noticjng a car in front of him weav-
ing in an err a tic manner over the center line decided to 
apprehend the driver. The traffic was heavy, moving 
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about 35 miles an hour. The defendant who was driving 
in an opposite direction from the officer decided to turn 
to the left in the middle of the block. He stopp·ed to let 
some cars pass him, giving the left turn signal and drove 
in front of the officer's n1otorcycle resulting in a colli-
sion. The Trial Court instructed the jury that the evi-
dence showed that the officer did not sound his siren at 
all and therefore he was not entitled to the exe1nption 
accorded emergency vehicles. The statute provided that 
"said exemption shall apply only when the driver of said 
vehicle sounds a siren as may be reasonably necessary as 
a warning to others." The court held that absence of the 
warning siren did not as a matter of law take the officer 
out of the exemption as the words "as may he reasonably 
necessary" indicates that there is some discretion on the 
part of the officer whether conditions required the sound-
ing of the siren. The court reaffirms the Lucas and 
Raynor cases and says: 
"Defendants argue evidentiary considerations 
th~t would establish contributory negligence on 
the part of the decedent in bar of plaintiffs' re-
covery of damages -that if he was traveling at 
60 miles an hour on the boulevard, as some wit-
nesses testified, his excessive speed coupled with 
his neglect to sound his siren contributed proxi-
mately to cause the accident; and, on the other 
hand_, if he was proceeding at 35 miles an hour, 
as other testimony indicates, his failure to keep on 
the lookout and avoid the dangers of traffic, which 
was concededly heavy at the time, contributed 
proximately to the fatal condition. But since in 
the p·erformance of his official duty, the decedent 
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was exen1pted from the restrictions of 'speed right 
of \vay,' and all other 'rules of the road', his lack 
of due care cannot be predicated on those elements 
if the 'reasonably necessary' warning contemplat-
ed by the statute was given. Lucas v. City of Los 
Angeles, supra, 10 Cal. 2d 476, 486, 75 P. 2d 599; 
see, also, Isaacs v. City and County of San Fran-
cisco, supra, 73 Cal. App. 2d 621, 626, 167 P. 2d 
221. Of course, if the decedent's conduct were 
found to be an 'arbitrary exercise of (his traffic) 
privileges' as where 'such driver' has given a 
'reasonably necessary' warning but sees that it has 
not been observed or heeded, and having oppor-
tunity to stop, he nevertheless continues on into 
an inevitable collision- he would not be relieved 
from his negligence because the issue would then 
be akin to that 'involved under the last clear 
chance doctrine.' " 
State of Wa.shington v. United States, 194 F. 2d 38. 
The United States maintained a fire department at its 
barracks near V ancouv.er, Washington and had an ar-
rangement with the City for n1utual assistance in case 
of a fire alarm. While the federal fire truck was enroute 
to the city fire station it collided with the vehicle which 
a state patrolman was driving. The patroln1an was not 
on any e1nergency mission. The State of Washington 
brought an action for damages to the vehicle and for the 
injuries sustained by the patrolman under theW orkmen's 
Compensation Law. The collision occurred at the inter-
section, the pa trohnan being on an arterial street and 
the fire truck entered the same without stopping. The 
eollision occurred near the center of the intersection when 
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the fire truck struck the left rear portion of the car driven 
by the patrolman. The patrohnan did not hear the gov-
ernment fire truck in time to avoid it and did not yield 
the right of way. The driver of the fire truck reduced 
its speed to approximately 25 miles an hour with the 
siren sounding and red lights flashing. The state statute 
provided that the laws applicable to the operation of ve-
hicles upon the public highways should not apply to "any 
emergency vehicle properly equipped as required by la"\\y 
and actually responding to an emergency call; provided, 
that the provisions of this section shall not relieve the 
operator of an authorized emergency vehicle of the duty 
to operate with due regard for the safety of all persons 
using the public highway nor shall it protect the operator 
of any such emergency vehicle from the consequence of a 
reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
It was contended that not withstanding the exemp-
tion of the fire truck from the statutory duty to stop be-
fore entering the aterial street, the driver of the truck 
should have looked out for and avoided striking the patrol 
car. The court says: 
"In the case of Balthasar v. Pacific Electric 
R.y. Co., 187 Cal. 302, 202 P. 37, 41, 19 A.L.R. 452, 
the Supreme Court of California had under con-
sideration a statute which gave the right of way 
to fire department apparatus and other emer-
gency vehicles while being operated as such 'with 
due regard to the safety of the public.' The Cali-
fornia Court construed the 'due regard to the 
safety of the public' limitation upon the exercise 
of the right of way granted to emergency vehicles 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
to mean only that the driver of the favored vehicle 
should give other users of the highway proper and 
adequate notice of its approach and thus afford 
those required to yield the right of way a reason-
able opportunity to do so. The rule of the Bal-
thasar case has been followed later in many Cali-
fornia cases." 
"It is in the public interest that an emergency 
vehicle reach its destination and accomplish its 
Inission as expeditiously as possible and, for that 
reason, it is given s,tatutory exemption from 
traffic regulations. The driver of the vehicle has 
the right to assume that, if he gives adequate warn-
ing of the approach, others will yield him the 
right of way and will take into account the fact 
that his speed is not subject to the usual limita-
tions. The exercise, in the public interest, of his 
special privileges as to speed and right of way 
is not consistent with due regard for the safety 
of others in the ordinary sense. If, as the Cali-
fornia Courts have pointed out, he is to be re-
quired to drive with due regard for the safety of 
other users of the highway, the san1e as unexempt 
drivers are required to do, then the exemption 
granted to him by the statutes 'vould be Ineaning-
less. 
"In the present case, the driver of the Gov-
ernment fire truck continuously sounded a siren 
and flashed red warning lights. He thus gave 
adequate and proper notice of the approach of an 
emergency vehicle and, we think, operated his ve-
hicle with due regard for the safety of other users 
on the city streets." 
Baltimore Transit Co. v. Young, 189 Md. 428, 56 A. 
2d 140. Miss Young wa~ riding in her automobile which 
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was being driven by Pitts. They had been to the hotel 
for supper and were driving ho1ne when they reached 
Howard Street. The traffic light was green and they 
proceed across the intersection oblivious of the north-
bound trouble truck of the Transit Company. Under the 
state law the trouble truck was an emergency vehicle 
and granted the right-of-way as such under the statute 
which provided that : 
"Upon the immediate approach of an author-
ized emergency vehicle, when the driver is giving 
audible signal by siren, exhaust whistle, or bell, 
the driver of every other vehicle shall yield the 
right of way and shall immediately drive to a 
position parallel to, and as close as possible to, 
the right-hand edge or some curb of the highway 
clear of any intersection and shall stop and re-
main in such position until the authorized emer-
gency vehicle has passed, except when otherwise 
directed by a police officer." 
Another statute provided that the exemption from 
the speed and other traffic regulations shall not relieve 
the driver from the duty "to drive with due. regard for 
the safety of all persons using the street," and shall not 
protect him from the consequence of a "reckless dis-
regard for the safety of others." 
Another act provided that "an emergency vehicle 
approaching a red or stop signal shall slow down as neces-
sary for safety and may proceed cautiously past such 
red or stop signal or stop sign." 
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Another section provided that the prima facie speed 
limitations and provisions relative to right of way, stop-
ping at through highways, rules of the road, traffic con-
trol devices and signals set forth in this article shall not 
apply to authorized emergency vehicles when responding 
to emergency calls and the drivers thereof sound audible 
signal by bell, siren, and exhaust whistle. 
"Thus, although, the driver of an emergency 
vehicle is ordinarily not limited in speed, and is 
authorized to drive with caution past a red light, 
he may nevertheless, be held liable for damages if 
in the exercise of his special privileges, he fails 
to give audible warning of his approach and pays 
no attention whatever to traffic on an intersecting 
street. Evidence that the driver of such a vehicle 
drove nt high speed past a r': i light at a busy 
intersection, without giving due \Varning to traffic 
on the intersecting street, warrants a finding that 
the vehicle was being opera ted with 'a reckless 
disregard for the safety of others.' On the other 
hand, the driver of such a vehicle cannot be ex-
pected to use the same care that the law requires 
of the ordinary motorist who has no emergency 
duty to perform. To stop at every slight indica-
tion of danger might often be a failure of duty in 
the past of the emergency driver. On many occa-
sions his prompt and fearless action is ilnpera-
tively necessary to prevent loss of property or loss 
of life, or both, or even widespread disaster." 
The driver of the trouble truck testified that he was 
going about 20 rniles an hour and slowed down when he 
approached the intersection; that he looked to the right 
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for west bound traffic, but believing the way was clear 
he increased his speed to over 20 miles an hour. Sud-
denly plaintiff's car appeared before him about 10 feet 
away. His companion testified that the red light on the 
truck kept flashing from the time he turned it on and 
that he blew the siren from the next street below. ThP 
driver of the car immediately behind the plaintiff's car 
testified he sa\\T the truck coming with the siren going full 
blast and the red light flashing. Two other witnesses 
testified they heard the siren. Goldberg, a taxicab driver, 
testified that he heard the siren only for a short distance 
before the truck reached the intersection. Pitts did not 
hear the siren. He testified that when they reached 
Howard Street, and had the green light, the car in front 
of him turned north and he started to cross and was 
knocked completely out. "In other words, when the slowly 
moving car ahead of him turned into Howard Street, he 
kept straight ahead and drove directly in front of the 
emergency truck with its siren screaming and its warn-
ing light flashing." 
"Plaintiff also called attention to Goldberg's 
testimony that the siren was not sounded the en-
tire distance from Fayette to Lexington Street, 
but only about a half block starting at the alley 
south of the May Co1npany's store. Goldberg's 
testimony shows no negligence on the part of the 
Baltimore Transit Company or its servants. Of 
course to impose upon a traveler on a highway 
the duty of giving the right of way to an author-
iz·ed emergency vehicle, notice to him must be 
given of its approach so that he has a reasonable 
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opportunity to stop or otherwise yield the right 
of way. Balthasar v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 187 
Cal. 302, 202 P. 37, 19 A.L.R·. 452, 458. In the in-
stant case, however, it was shown that the siren 
was heard plainly by other automobile drivers in 
the vicinity. Undoubtedly, Pitts, by th'e exercise 
of ordinary care and caution, could easily have 
heard the siren in sufficient time to yield the right 
of way to the emergency vehicle, and thus could 
have avoided the collision. Moreover, as th.ere 
was no rain or fog to obscure his vision, he could 
easily have seen the flashing light. 
"Pitts and plaintiff testified that they did not 
hear the siren and did not see the flashing light. 
But we accept the rule that when a witness testi-
fies that he did not see or hear a certain object 
which, if he had actually looked and listened, he 
must necessarily have seen and heard, his testi-
Inony is not worthy of consideration." 
"In the case before us there is no substantial 
conflict in the evidence as to material facts. Plain-
tiff did not meet the burden of establishing some 
negligent act, or omission of defendant assuming 
the truth of all the evidence on behalf of plain-
tiff, yet no ground vvas shown for recovery. There-
fore the judgment for plaintiff rnust be reversed." 
Reversed without a new trial. 
Willia1ns v. City of P,ittsburgh, 349 Pa. 430, 37 A. 
2d 540. Plaintiff was injured when his n1otorcycle and a 
fire truck collided at an intersection. The signal light 
'vas green for plaintiff and red for the fire truck. The 
fire truck was traveling frorn 40 to 45 miles an hour. 
The plaintiff alleged that no bell or siren was sounded. A 
verdict was found for the plaintiff, but the court gave de-
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fendant judgment notvfithstanding the verdict. The negli-
gence claimed was ( 1) the speed of the fire truck, ( 2) 
its running through a red light, and (3) the failure to 
give warning of its approach. The statute provided that 
speed limitation applicable to other vehicles should not 
apply to those of the fire department traveling in re-
sponse to a fire alarm if "operated with due regard for 
safety" and not with "a reckless disregard of safety of 
others." It was also provided that the ordinary rules 
with respect to signal light at intersections were not ap-
plicable to fire department vehicles. Plaintiff testified 
no bell or siren was sounded, but if there had been he 
would have been able to hear it. 
A witness for plaintiff who was driving a truck four 
or five truck lengths to the rear of plaintiff said he did 
not hear any siren or bell until the fire truck got into the 
intersection. He heard it ihen. Opposing this testimony 
the acting captain on the fire truck testified he rang the 
bell and with his foot operated the electrical siren. The 
driver said the bell and siren were both being sounded. 
Three other witnesses testified to the same effeet - two 
of them being school boys who had heard the siren and 
turned around to watch. The third was a newspaper 
route man wlio heard the siren. The court says: 
"Negative testi1nony of a plaintiff and his 
witnesses that they did not hear any whistle or 
bell of an approaching vehicle is sufficient to go 
to the jury if the defendant produces no evidence 
to the contrary, but if there is positive testimony 
of witnesses that they did hear such a warning 
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given, the negative testimony is insufficient to 
make out a charge of negligence. 
"'An analysis of the evidence in the present 
case indicates that it does not measure up to the 
required ,standard. The testimony of plaintiff's 
witness was wholly negative in character, and 
plaintiff's own testimony, although expressed in 
more affirmative terms, was not buttressed by any 
state1nent to the effect that as he drove his motor-
cycle along Bayard Street he was consciously lis-
tening for "\Varnings from traffic approaching 
frorn the intersecting street; for all that appears, 
his failure to hear vvhat so 1nany others heard may 
have been due to 1nental pre-occupation or inat-
tention. In view of this fact, in view of the posi-
tive testimony of five witnesses on behalf of de-
fendant that the bell was rung and the siren 
sounded, and in view of the testimony of plain-
tiff's O\Vn witness that he heard the siren at least 
as the fire truck came into the intersection, no 
verdict for plaintiff could be sustained on his mere 
assertion that no audible warning was given. The 
action of the court below in granting judgment for 
defendant n. o. v. was therefore proper." 
We shall now proceed to a consideration of the speci-
fic points relied on. 
(a) Points nu1nbers 4 and 10. Instruction No. 14 
was erroneous as a whole. First, under the authorities 
cited above, this instruction should not have been given 
at all in view of the court's Instruction No. 13, in which 
the jury were told that the truck proceeded with red 
lights displayed and a siren sounding, according to law. 
lTnder the authorities above cited such an instruction 
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is inconsistent with giving of Instruction No. 1-!. !-laving 
so found, under the facts of this case, that should have 
been the end of the matter, for clearly there was no evi-
dence of a reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
Second, the. instruction as a whole is ambiguous and 
confusing. In the first paragraph the court states the 
law to be that a fireman n1ay go through a red light only 
after slowing down as may be necessary for the safe op-
eration of the fire truck and is not relieved of the duty 
to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons. 
Then the jury were told that they must determine whether 
this privilege was used properly by defendant reducing 
his speed as much as may have been necessary for the 
safe operation of the fire truck and by driving with due 
regard for the safety of all persons. 
In the last paragraph they are told to find for plain-
tiff, if they find defendant :negligently failed to reduce his 
speed as much as was necessary for the safe operation 
of the truck, or negligently failed to keep the truck under 
proper control, or negligently failed to keep a proper 
lookout for other vehicles in or approaching the inter-
section. In this last part nothing is said about driving 
with due regard for the safety of all persons, even though 
the jury was previously told they must determine that 
point. Undoubtedly, under such· an instruction the jury 
would feel free to find for plaintiff on the ground that 
defendant had not driven "\vith due regard for the safety 
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of others without regard to any findings they may ha.ve 
made as to the three grounds that were submitted to 
the1n in the last paragraph of the instruction. 
Furthermore, the duty to drive with due regard for 
the safety of other persons is fully and completely dis-
charged, under the authorities cited, by the sounding 
of the siren and the displaying of a red light, which fac-
tors are admitted in Instruction No. 13. 
Third, under the language of the last paragraph of 
Instruction No. 14, the jury were at liberty to consider 
defendant's driving in the same light and with no more 
protection to hin1 than if he had not been driving an emer-
gency vehicle. By this language it is assumed that the 
defendant was in the same position as the driver of an 
ordinary vehicle. Now here in the statute is any thing 
said about proper control or proper lookout. If those fac-
tors are here involved they must be deemed a part of the 
general li1nitation of driving with due regard for the 
safety of others, and the instruction should have clarified 
that point. 
Fourth, Instruction No. 1-! is the only instruction 
purporting to state the grounds relied upon by plaintiff 
for a recovery. But the jury were no-vvhere instructed 
as to what items of negligence they "' .. ere limited to in 
detern1ining whether defendant was liable, unless it be· 
assuined that because the instruction directed a recovery 
if the jury found defendant guilty of all or either of the 
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three stated items of negligence, that constituted a lilnita-
tion. No such assumption is warranted as the jury \vas 
also told to find whether defendant drove without regard 
for the safety of all persons, and further, under the gen-
eral language of Instruction No. 10, the jury were told 
that if defendant was negligent, without defining or lin1it-
ing the items of negligence, plaintiff would be entitled 
to recover unless he was guilty of contributory negligence. 
Instruction No. 10 does not limit the jury to the items 
stated in Instruction No. 14, nor does the latter say that 
the items there stated are the only items of negligence 
before the jury. Instruction No. 10, as a mere statement 
of law, is no doubt correct, but without a restriction any 
where, and especially in No. 14, as to the specific items 
of negligence involved, the jury were left to find de-
fendant guilty of negligence upon any ground of negli-
gence the jury might find existed. 
It is well here to point out again that nowhere did 
the court submit to the jury the question as to whether 
defendant drove at an excessive rate of speed, and yet 
the jury might have concluded that defendant was driving 
at an excessive rate of speed since the items of negligence 
were not defined or limited in the instructions. The 
court must have concluded that the element was not in-
volved notwithstanding the pleadings and the pre-trial 
order. So that under the statutes above quoted we have 
as the only limitation upon defendant's driving into the 
intersection against the red light that he slow down as 
necessa.ry for the safe operation of the truck and that he 
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drive with due regard for the safety of all others and 
not in reckless disregard thereof and as to both of which 
the evidence shows he fully complied. 
(b) POINT NO. 5. FAILURE TO KEEP THE FIRE 
TRUCK UNDER PROPER CONTROL. 
In Instruction No. 14 the court submitted to the jury 
\vhether defendant negligently failed to keep his truck 
under proper control. There is not the slightest evidence 
anywhere in the record of lack of proper control, as we 
have heretofore pointed out under Points Nos. 1 and 2. 
The 1nere happening of a collision is no evidence of lack of 
control. The fact that defendant did not see the Oberg 
car until just before the impact is no evidence of lack 
of control. The fact that he brought the truck to a stop 
in a straight line notwithstanding the right tie rod was 
broken and the steering mechanism was thereby damaged 
is conclusive proof that he had the truck under proper 
control. Furthermore, he testified he could have stopped 
at the north cross \valk if the traffic had not stopped 
for him. The effect of submitting this issue to the jury 
\Vas to let them speculate, without any evidence, that de-
fendant failed to have the truck under control, or to in-
fer that element fro1n the Inere happening of the accident. 
This was clearly erroneous and prejudicial. 
(c) POINT 6. FAILURE TO DRIVE WITH DUE RE-
GARD FOR THE SAFETY OF ALL PERSONS. 
The authorities heretofore cited clearly demonstrate 
that there was no evidence upon which the court could be 
justified in submitting this issue to the jury. Having dis-
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played the red lights and having sol:tnded the siren the 
defendant had fully complied with the reqnire1nent to 
drive with due regard for the safety of others. Instruct-
ing the jury to make a finding on this issue "Tas erroneous 
and prejudicial. 
(d) POINTS NO. 7 and 8. FAILURE TO REDUCE 
SPEED AS NE~CESSARY FOR THE SAFE OPERATION OF 
THE TRUCK. 
In the first place the evidence of the four fire1nan 
was that the speed of the truck was reduced from 40 to 
45 miles per hour to about 25 miles per hour as defendant 
approached the intersection. It then appeared that the 
traffic had heard and heeded his approaching warnings, 
for a car was stopped on the west side and another on the 
east side of the intersection waiting for him to pass. 
Neither the testimony of Jensen that it was not apparent 
that the truck slowed down and that it seemed like it came 
on at the same rate, nor that of F'arnsworth that he did 
not notice or recall that the speed was reduced, is suff~ 
c1ent to raise a conflict against the fireman's testimony. 
But aside from the lack of evidence to warrant sub-
mission of this factor, where is the evidence that a slow-
ing down was rendered necessary under the conditions 
then obtaining~ The requirement to slow do\vn is not 
absolute under the statute. It,is only when nece~ssary for 
the safe operation of the truck. This involves a discre-
tion on the part of the driver. There must be some con-
dition shown. that would make it necessary to slow the 
truck down to provide safe operation. The mere happen-
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ing of the accident does not prove that a slowing down 
vvas necessary to safely operate the truck. The evidence 
shows that Oberg's car suddenly and unexpectedly ap-
peared from the opposite side of Nielsen's car into the 
intersection. The speed of the truck, as testified to, was 
not so fast as to furnish proof that the truck could not be 
safely operated. It is common knowledge that the speed 
testified to was not unusual. The speed given in several 
of the cases hereto£ ore cited was in most instances as 
great as is here involved. 
Certainly this provision of the statute must apply 
to the safe operation of the truck as such, and that is the 
construction the court made of it in its instruction. The 
requirement that the truck be operated with due regard 
for the safety of others and not with reckless disregard 
thereof is covered by the express provisions of sections 
±1-6-14 and 41-6-76, U.C.A., 1953. The two provisions, 
therefore, must not be synonymous. This provision that 
there be a slowing down as necessary certainly must have 
inherent in its application that conditions exist that would 
require a slowing down such as someone being already 
in the intersection with whom a collision is likely or that 
the fire truck may be so driven that it will not collide 
with persons or vehicles waiting in obedience to the law. 
The wording of this part of this instruction is such 
that it assumes that in any instance, regardless of the 
speed shovvn by the evidence, a reduction of speed must 
be made or the jury may f]nd negligence. The jury were 
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not told to find whether under all the conditions shown l)y 
the evidence that a slowing down was in fact necessary 
in this instance to safely operate the truck. Under the 
instruction as given the jury might very well assume 
the mere happening of the collision is sufficient proof that 
the speed was not reduced as was necessary for its safe 
operation. 
As pointed out in Point No. 8, the court furnished 
the jury with no guide in determining what elements are 
involved in the failure to slow down. Where must the 
~slowing down take place~ Must it continue on into the 
intersection and to the point of impact~ The evidence 
showed a reduction took p1ace to a point about 125 feet 
north of the cross walk and then the speed was increased. 
The jury might very well have believed the defendant 
slowed down and then accelerated his speed, and yet un-
der the instruction, conclude this was not a compliance 
with the law. They were left, therefore, to their specula-
tions with a wholly inadequate instruction. Finally, the 
matter of failing to slo'v down was not in issue either 
under the grounds of negligence charged in the complaint 
or the grounds stated in the pre-trial order. We submit 
that an allegation of driving at an excessive rate of speed 
in excess of 35 miles per hour does not raise the issue 
of whether a slowing down was necessary in order to 
proceed against the red light. The statute expressly per-
mits a speed in excess of the prima facie speed limits 
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and in any case it 1night appear that the existing condi-
tions would 1nake it necessary to slow down even below 
the statu tory speed li1ni t. 
POINT NO. 9. F AlLURE TO KEEP PROPER LOOKOUT. 
The court instructed the jury that if the defendant 
negligently failed to keep a proper lookout for other ve-
hicles their verdict should be for plaintiff. This submits 
to the jury the question of proper lookout upon the 
same basis as if defendant were not driving an emer-
gency vehicle. Nowhere in the statute is anything said 
about a proper lookout. The standard of care to be exer-
cised hy a driver of an e1nergency vehicle is contained in 
subdivision 4 (e) of Section 41-6-14 and 41-6-76. Sub-
divi_sion -± (e) says that the driver of an emergency 
vehicle shall drive with due regard for the safety of all 
persons, the 1neaning of vvhich we have already estab-
lished by the authorities heretofore cited. It also says 
that the statute shall not protect him from the conse-
quences of his reckless disregard for the safety of others. 
It is apparent that this involves 1nore than the 1nere 
negligent failure to observe soxne traffic rule or rule of 
care. It involves a reckless disregard. Under the law 
defendant had the right to assu1ne that persons on the 
street \vould heed his warnings and yield the right of way. 
Because of this he was not required to keep the same at-
tentive lookout as others vvould be required to give. The 
statute says he 1nay not recklessly disregard the safety 
of others. This in itself infers that he will not be liable 
for what \vould be 1nere negligence on the part of the 
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driver of an ordinary vehicle. An analagous situation 
is that of a driver and his guest when the former is not 
liable to the latter for mere negligence but is for a reck-
less disregard for the guest's safety. We do not say 
that failure to keep a look out is never involved where the 
driver of an emergency vehicle is involved; what we say 
is that the failure to keep a lookout must, under the cir-
cumstances involved, amount to a reckless disregard for 
the safety of others, such as would be involved if the evi-
dence showed that the other car was already in the inter-
section, plainly visible, or readily discoverable in time 
for the fireman to stop, or otherwise avoid a collision. 
The evidence would have to be of a character to sustain a 
finding that he had the last clear chance to avoid the 
collision. 
We submit there is no evidence in this case showing 
such a lack of proper control as to permit that issue be-
ing submitted to the jury. Defendant saw the traffic 
stopped and waiting for him. There is no evidence what-
ever that Oberg's car was in such position to he observed 
and at such a time as would indicate to defendant that 
Oberg was not heeding his warnings and enable the de-
fendant to avoid the collision. The evidence is all to the 
contrary. Oberg's car came speeding from behind and 
past Nielsen's car into the intersection in a flash. The 
truck being then where it was, the collision was inevitable. 
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POINT NO. 11. ERROR FOR THE COURT NOT TO IN-
STRUCT THAT DEFENDANT, HAVING DISPLAYED RED 
LIGHTS AND SOUNDED THE SIREN, HAD COMPLIED 
WITH THE LAW. 
Defendant by his requested instruction No. 3 asked 
the court to instruct the jury as follows : 
'"The fact, if it is a fact, that Mr. Oberg, 
driver of the car in which plaintiff was riding, did 
not hear the siren or see the red light in time· to 
stop and yield the rjght of way, or for any other 
:reason failed to yield the right of vvay, would not 
alter the right of the defendant to proceed through 
the intersection and he would not be liable in this 
action, unless it should appear from the evidence 
that the defendant became aware, or in the exer-
cise of due diligence, should have become aware 
of Oberg's failure to yield the right of way in 
time to have permitted defendant to avoid the 
collision." 
The defendant excepted to the failure of the court to 
so instruct. All of the foregoing argument leads to the 
point that the court should have instructed as defendant 
requested. The evidence was undisputed, as found by 
the court in Instruction No. 13, that defendant sounded 
the siren and displayed red lights visible more than 500 
feet in front of the fire truck. This was tantamount to a 
finding that he was driving with due regard to the safety 
of all others as held by the authorities heretofore cited. 
There is no showing of a reckless disregard for others. 
There is no showing that he failed to slow down as was 
necessary for the safe operation of the truck. l-Ie had 
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fully complied with the statutory conditions upon \vhieh 
his exemption from traffic laws was based. He then had 
a right to proceed through the red light, unless it should 
appear from the evidence that defendant became aware, 
or in the exercise of due care, should have become aware 
of Oberg's failure to yield the right of way in ti1ne to 
have permitted defendant to avoid the collision, assun1-
ing, of course, there was sufficient evidence to submit 
the last clear chance to the jury. 
POINT NO. 12. ERROR FOR THE COURT NOT TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY IF COLLISION WAS DUE SOLELY TO 
OBERG'S NEGLIGENCE DEFENDANT WOULD NO·T BE 
LIABLE. 
In requested instruction No. 6, defendant requested 
as follows: 
"If you believe from the evidence that the 
driver of the car in vvhich plaintiff was riding was 
negligent under all the conditions shown by the 
evidence in entering upon the intersection and not 
stopping or otherwise yielding the right of way 
to said fire truck, and you further find that the 
driver of said fire truck was not at fault under the 
conditions revealed by the evidence, then your ver-
dict must be for the defendant, no cause of action." 
Defendant excepte.d to th'e court's failure to so In-
struct. 
We have heretofore argued the proposition that the 
court should have granted esur motion to dismiss and also 
should have directed a verdict for defendant, one of the 
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grounds in each case being that the evidence showed that 
Oberg's negligence was the sole proximate cause of the 
accident. We are now presenting the point that at the 
least defendant was entitled to have that issue squarely 
presented to the jury for its consideration. In Instruc-
tion No. 9, the jury were told that the act of one or more 
persons may work concurrently as the efficient causes of 
the injury, and each would be regarded as the proximate 
cause. By Instruction No. 10, the jury were instructed 
that if defendant's negligence was a proximate cause of 
the injury he would be liable even though they should 
also find Oberg was also negligent and such negligence 
was a proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. Now here 
were the jury instructed as to the result if Oberg's negli-
gence was the sole proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. 
By the court instructing as it did, the jury were permitted 
to consider only the possible concurrence of defendant's 
and Oberg's negligence. They were not permitted to 
consider the eventuality of Oberg's negligence alone being 
the sole proximate cause, or the effect that such sole 
proximate cause, would have in relieving defendant of 
liability. Clearly under the evidence of this case, and in 
the interest of presenting the case fully and fairly to the 
jury the defendant was entitled to have his requested in-
struction, or something similar, given to the jury and 
the court's refusal constitutes prejudicial error. 
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POINT NO. 13. THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING 
IN EVIDENCE THE OPINION OF S. S. TAYLOR AS TO THE 
SPEED OF THE FIRE TRUCK IN ANSWERING HYPOTHE-
TI·CAL QUESTIONS WITHOUT PROPER FOUNDATION. 
The hypothetical questions asked Taylor as to the 
speed of the fire truck vvere based entirely upon th·e 
observations and testimony of Officer Peterson. It as-
sumed that Officer Peterson had testified as to all the 
elements necessary so that the hypothetical question 
would be based in all its parts upon the evidence in the 
record, for Taylor had no first hand knowledge of these 
necessary factors. 
The hypothetical questions assumed that there were 
two sets of tire marks, one made by the wheels on one 
side and the other by the wheels on the other side, run-
ning the same direction, having the same characteristics; 
that the tire 1narks indicated that the front wheels were 
locked and sliding from the beginning to the end; that 
both tire marks were continuous and uninterrupted. 
Peterson did not so testify. He did not examine the right 
tire marks, only the left ( p. 28, 33). He saw evidence of 
front wheel tire marks on the left side, but not on the 
right side (p. 32). He traced the left tire back to the 
beginning but did not observe where the left front tire 
took hold, nor could he tell how far the right front tire 
went. We submit that under this state of the record there 
was no foundation for the question. It is well to point out 
too that Taylor in an~wering the question assumed to 
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know what the four rear tires looked like as to wear 
conditions by looking at the 2 front tires in a photo intro-
duced as Exhibit P-1 (p. 184) and as to the nature of the 
street surface by looking at this same ph.oto. 
CONCLUSION 
Fron1 the foregoing \Ve think it is apparent that the 
judgment appealed from should be reversed. To hold de-
fendant liable under the evidence in this case would be to 
place a fireman driving in response to a fire in the same 
category as the driver of an ordinary vehicle. The statu-
tory exemptions granted hin1 would be a snare rather 
than a protection in the faithful performance of his 
duties. I-Iaving sounded his siren and having displayed 
red lights all as required by the statute, and having o b-
served that the traffic at the intersection was standing 
and waiting for hi1n to pass, he was fully qualified to 
take advantage of the statutory exemptions granted him 
to proceed through the intersection. The burden was then 
upon the plaintiff to show that he proceeded in reckless 
disregard for the safety of others. Certainly no such reck-
lessness is shown here, where Oberg's car suddenly flash-
ed from behind a waiting car into the intersection in a 
matter of a split second and when defendant was then 
already in the intersection rendering the collision in-
evitable. We submit that the trial court should have 
granted our motion to dismiss or directed verdict as re-
quested by defendant. A reversal without a new trial 
should be entered by this court. 
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Should the court differ with us on the first conelu-
sion, we respectfully submit that a reversal should be 
entered and a new trial granted upon the errors in the 
instructions referred to in this brief. These errors were 
basic and were prejudicial to the defendant. 
< 
R.espectfully submitted, 
E. R. CHRIS.TENSEN 
City Attorn,ey 
HOMER HOLMGREN 
Assistwnt City Attorney 
GAYLE DEAN HUNT 
Ass~stant City Attorney 
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